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This paper compares reform ownership in Ghana and Tanzania over the past two decades.
It finds that on several dimensions, Ghana’s early economic reforms enjoyed a high degree
of ownership. That ownership was not embedded, however, in a politico-institutional
framework that ensured that ownership would be maintained. Initial efforts to broaden
consultation were not maintained and the small economic team was insufficiently widened.
The politically more difficult second-generation reforms, the move to multi-party
democracy and the exponential increase in aid contributed to a decline in ownership in
Ghana. In the case of Tanzania, while initial reform efforts were made without aid, the
acrimonious debate with donors that preceded the eventual agreement with the IMF and
the socialist ideological heritage strengthened the perception of little ownership.
Tanzania’s relatively weak state capacity and weakened policy decision making process
have contributed to lower ownership. Most important, however, the high degree of aid
dependency and dominance of donors sometimes tends to mask the real attempts the
country is making. Tanzania has made interesting innovations in trying to manage its
relations with donors. If they are to succeed, state and institutional capacity must be
strengthened and donors must give the country some space.
Keywords: foreign aid, conditionality, Ghana, Tanzania, political economy
JEL classification: F35, O551
1. Introduction
Ghana and Tanzania provide interesting contrasts of sub-Saharan Africa’s reform
experience. Though situated in politically volatile regions of the continent, they have so far
managed to steer clear of political destabilisation and have been able to introduce and
maintain political pluralism. Reform ownership by policymakers and institutions and
participation in policy making by the population are key ingredients of reform success.
Both countries have tried to address these issues in recent years. Ghana was an early
reformer, starting already in the 1980s, while Tanzania was a much later convert to the
reform process. In the latter part of the 1990s Ghana experienced significant backsliding in
its reform efforts, associated partly to the policy diversion implied by the introduction of
political pluralism. However, while Tanzania, whose policy of state-led development was
for several years supported by a number of bilateral donors, was ostensibly slow to reform
and slower still in committing to market liberalisation, it is now seen as making tangible
progress. Comparing the experiences of Ghana and Tanzania is thus useful in trying to
understand how reform ownership affects economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa.
There are several reasons why reform ownership is an important determinant of policy
success. Typically economic reforms involve difficult decisions that, at least initially, have
negative impacts on important segments of the population. Devaluation and trade
liberalisation, for example, affect not only the activities of exporters and importers but also
those of manufacturers and, in the countryside, commodity producers. On the other hand,
fiscal adjustment, civil service reforms and privatisation impact variously on the welfare of
groups engaged within and outside the public sector and in the different geographic
regions. There are thus bound to be winners and losers during the reform process and net
gainers are often difficult to pinpoint a priori. Where potential losers are plentiful and well
connected, reforms will be resisted. Since the benefits of the reforms accrue only in the
medium to long run it is necessary for the government to be committed. In the absence of
commitment reforms cannot to be sustained, with reversal likely in the face of political
opposition.
This chapter looks at the subject of reform ownership in sub-Saharan Africa with Ghana
and Tanzania as case studies. It identifies the factors, including institutions and policies,
that determine the countries’ capacity to formulate, implement and sustain economic
reforms. Section 2 reviews the evidence on the links between ownership and reform, while
section 3 provides a chronology of the reform process in both countries, including the role
of domestic institutions as well as that of donors. Section 4 summarises the determinants of
reform ownership and concludes the chapter.
2. Linking ownership to reform outcomes
Since reform ownership touches on a wide range of policy and institutional issues, it tends
to defy simple characterisation and definition. Johnson and Wasty (1993) have suggested
four contexts in which reform ownership can be demonstrated: At the level of initiation;
during the process of refinement when broad consensus among policymakers is required to
move ahead; with respect to expressible political support for reform; and the extent of
public support and participation. In the case of initiation, for example, ownership is2
considered high when the government initiates and implements the programme as opposed
to when the programme is prepared by the World Bank itself.
Research on reform ownership has focused on two main areas, corresponding roughly to
the role of donors and multilateral agencies in the process and the response of recipient
governments. To the first set of studies belong those that have looked at the effectiveness
of policy conditionality in bringing about reform (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Collier,
1997; Killick, 1997; White and Morrissey, 1997; Killick et al., 1998, International
Monetary Fund, 2001). The second set of studies examines more directly the link between
ownership and policy implementation and outcomes (World Bank, 1998; Dollar and
Svensson, 1997; Devarajan et al., 2001).
Policy conditionality relates closely to the political economy of reform ownership. It is
instructive that the authors of the External Evaluation of the ESAF noted that ‘a common
theme that runs through perceptions of ESAF at the country level is a feeling of loss of
control over the policy content and the pace of implementation of reform programs.’
(International Monetary Fund, 1998: 36). The recipient country’s ability to influence its
reform ownership depends on the size of its financial resources, human capacities and on
its strategic importance. In a context where one party is perceived to be weak, with little
technical competence to propose options or to implement programmes, ownership will be
difficult to achieve. There are several examples of this in the World Bank’s negotiations
with its member countries. Those with greater bureaucratic and policy management
expertise, such as Argentina and Chile, are not only better prepared for negotiations but are
also more likely to get their points of view incorporated in the programmes.
African case studies in Devarajan et al. (2001) strongly suggest that while conditionality
may, in a period of rapid reform, be helpful in establishing a country’s credibility, its
usefulness is often short-lived.1 This is because the continued use of conditionality by
donors masks efforts at reform ownership, even in environments where it is beginning to
take root. Moreover, the arduous process of confirming whether the conditions have been
fulfilled gives the impression that reforms are imposed from outside. It is also likely that
numerous conditionalities complicate the policy debate, as was partly the case in Ghana in
the late eighties, making it difficult for domestic groups to participate meaningfully.
The studies in Devarajan et al. (2001) reached a number of conclusions on ownership and
economic reform in Africa. First that, implementation aside, the success of reforms is a
result of the extent to which governments have been able to undertake broad domestic
consultation. However, the latter need not necessarily follow any predetermined pattern. In
Uganda, for example, the government used its umbrella type political structure, which by
excluding individual political parties from power is not seen as democratic in the Western
sense, to enable a fair amount of consultation during the reform process. ‘President
Museveni established the Presidential National Forum to debate reform issues in 1987. The
Uganda’s Manufacturers Association sponsored seminars and discussion papers in the
1987-9 period. The Presidential Economic Council had open debates on reform and
sponsored a December 1989 conference on trade liberalization that has been described as a
turning point in public opinion’ (Devarajan et al., 2001: 11).
1 Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia.3
Also crucial for reform ownership is the institutional capacity of governments. Since
ownership means both that political commitment exists and that there are ‘able technocrats
who can work out the details of reform’ (Devarajan et al., 2001: 29), technical assistance
that provides training and policy advice to ensure this can be useful in strengthening and
broadening the foundation of ownership. Aid during reforms, by increasing the benefits of
the latter or reducing their disruptive impacts, could also strengthen commitment and
increase the likelihood that reforms are sustained. The case studies find, however, that
complex reforms, such as privatisation and civil service reform, that directly threaten
vested interests are difficult to champion, while macroeconomic reforms, being less
discriminating in their impacts, are associated with greater ownership.
In the Johnson and Wasty study cited above, based on a sample of 81 World Bank
adjustment credits approved in thirty-eight countries between 1980 and 1988, a positive
correlation is found between ownership and how satisfactorily the programmes met their
objectives.2 They also found that ownership was strongly predictive of programme
success in 73 percent of all cases. Notably, the commitment of the country's political
leadership was found to be the most important determinant of success. Similar findings are
cited in Kahler (1992) and Killick et al. (1998). They indicate that in reform programmes
considered well implemented, the government's prior commitment was a crucial factor. By
contrast, the majority of the poorly implemented ones took place in environments of low
commitment.
Political legitimacy and credibility are thus key ingredients. Johnson (1994) observes, with
respect to the poor implementation of IMF programmes, that lack of legitimacy means that
the government will ‘attain only a rather modest degree of implementation in the face of
sabotage, indifference, non participation, and minimum effort and compliance from the
general population.’ However, the experience of countries such as Ghana, Korea and
Uganda suggests that in the short to medium run it might be possible to pursue reform
relatively well even where political legitimacy was lacking. This is because reforms that
generate growth and improve the standards of living are likely to find support, in spite of
the perceived illegitimacy of the governments implementing them. However, in the long
run, reforms nurture their own demands for political change, and governments eventually
have to address political reforms as well.
There are two important weaknesses of the empirical analyses of reform ownership
reviewed above. First, efforts are often biased towards assessing government, thereby
ignoring beneficiary ownership. Second, the ‘measurement’ of ownership is often done ex
post and not when it is happening, raising the possibility that evaluators could be biased by
their perception of developments in the country.
Ignoring beneficiary ownership can be a costly oversight. For example, Ndulu (2001: 6)
argues that in enforcing accountability and ensuring aid effectiveness, strengthening the
2 Assessed by looking at four indicators: (i) who initiated reforms; (ii) political leadership’s commitment;
(iii) technocrats’ intellectual conviction; and (iv) how broad-based the support for reforms is. Each of these
indicators was rated according to a four level scale depending on the degree of ownership. So for example, in
the case of the first indicator, if the government initiated and implemented the programme then ownership
was highest. On the other hand, if the programme was prepared by the Bank and implemented despite serious
disagreements then ownership was ranked at the lowest level.4
voice of the citizens is crucial. This can only be ensured by their increased participation in
the design and implementation of the programmes. However, although evidence from the
aid effectiveness literature highlights the importance of beneficiary participation for
performance, this is easier to do at the project than the macroeconomic level. Furthermore,
the fact that ‘ownership’ tends to be ‘measured’ after the fact is problematic. In
conjunction with the subjectivity of the term itself, there is the risk of the evaluation being
biased by perceptions of developments in the country at a given moment. In a sense, we are
‘predicting’ after the event. Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 7) argue that what is important
in assessing ownership is not so much the progress made with respect to some ‘variables’
but rather the extent to which reforms have become ‘consolidated’ i.e. ‘that they have been
institutionalised within the policy system’. This is important because it ensures the
existence of stable coalitions of political support.
But of perhaps more serious concern are the queries raised by Killick et al. (1998) and
Lancaster (1999) on the desirability of ownership for reform success. Using a principal-
agent framework, Killick argues that ‘ownership’ is really a proxy for the extent to which
the reforms are perceived to be in the interest of the government and the population. In
other words, the degree of government ownership that is demonstrated is a function of the
extent to which its objectives dominate those of the donors. Ownership is thus an indicator
of ‘interest conflict’. Under domestic ownership, the government is in the driver’s seat as
far as identifying priorities and changes is concerned, while in its absence the donors’
objectives and priorities dominate, increasing the possibility of interest conflict.
In Killick’s view, there is unlikely to be convergence between the objectives and interests
of donors and recipients. The reasons he gives are that the two parties ‘are conditioned by
different historical and institutional backgrounds; they are answerable to different
constituencies; they each have their own internal management imperatives; there may be
differences in attitude to the role of the supporting finance offered by donors (the moral
hazard issue); there are asymmetries in the incidence of adjustment costs, including the
costs of mistakes, and these lead to differing attitudes to risk and the desirable speed of
change; nationalistic resentment of ‘donor interference’ and of inequities in the treatment
of countries is apt to give rise to generalised suspicion of externally recommended policy
reforms’ (Killick et al., 1998: 98-9). The existence of ‘interest conflict’ helps to explain
why ownership may not be sufficient to generate the desired economic outcomes.
Finally, ownership is a dynamic and endogenous concept. Generally, good economic
outcomes will tend to support greater ownership. In Botswana, for example, diamonds and
the benefits of a well-managed economy not only led to steady economic growth—they
also reduced the economic importance of aid, giving the government an advantage in its
negotiations with donors (Maipose et al., 1997). Even governments that might initially be
lukewarm about reforms are likely to change their tactics when they perceive that the
reforms are enhancing their political capital. On the other hand, no amount of ownership
can prop up a programme that fails to yield tangible benefits over time. As the saying goes,
‘success has many parents, but failure is an orphan’.
3. Economic reforms in Ghana and Tanzania
In both Ghana and Tanzania, economic crisis was an important impetus for reform. The
initiation and sequencing of reforms and political change, and their implications for5
economic policy differed, however, influenced by the historical context of each country.
Thus in both cases it is important to understand the economic quandary that had to be
addressed as well as the nature of the ensuing reform process.
In Ghana, a democratically elected government was overthrown in 1981 in a coup d’état.
On seizing power, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and his populist Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC) inherited a bankrupt economy. Economic mismanagement
during previous governments, as well as adverse terms of trade, had led to economic
stagnation, economic imbalances characterised by severe shortages, ineffective controls
and corruption. By 1977, inflation had reached 77 percent and production had shrunk in
every sector of the economy.3
While the PNDC recognised the severity of the problems it faced, internal dissent meant
that an economic reform program could not be adopted until towards the end of the
military regime’s first year in power (1982),4 when it felt more secure. By then, it had
become clear to the PNDC how few alternatives were available. Ideological supporters of
the regime, not only influential leftist intellectuals but also the governments of Libya and
the Soviet Union, indicated that the PNDC had little choice but to turn to the Bretton
Woods institutions for assistance. A number of exogenous shocks in 1983, including a
severe drought, bush fires that decimated the cocoa crop and the deportation of over a
million Ghanaians workers from neighbouring Nigeria, as well as a number of counter-
coup attempts in the earlier part of the PNDC rule, compounded the sense of crisis.
What then gave the PNDC the political space to undertake economic reforms initially? The
1981 coup marked a significant break from the past. Rawlings was not beholden to the
established interest groups (parastatal managers, holders of import licenses or former
politicians) and could afford to undertake politically difficult reforms such as currency
devaluation. The political sphere was implicitly demarcated into the beneficiaries of the
earlier system of controls and import licensing, that is former politicians and their
associates, and its own supporters, including labour unions, workers, the armed forces,
farmers and students (Tsikata, 2000). The former were kept out of the new government’s
initial reforms while the empowerment of the latter was said to be the PNDC’s raison
d’être. That the leadership was convinced that the reforms would help the poor was also an
important factor in consolidating reform in the initial years of the PNDC (Herbst, 1993;
Jeffries, 1991).
With the advent of multiparty democracy and the elections of 1992, the reform process
became more complex, however. By their nature, second generation reforms, such as
privatisation and civil service reforms, went well beyond core ministries, requiring the
involvement of both sector ministries and sub-national governments. The difficulty of
economic reform in a budding democracy was brought into stark relief by the VAT fiasco
3 There is a voluminous literature on economic reform in Ghana. See for example Aryeetey et al. (2000),
Pereira et al. (2000) and Herbst (1993). My paper extends the literature by focusing on reform ownership in a
comparative perspective.
4 However, the underlying ideological battles and power struggles within the inner circle were not over.
Between 1982 and 1985, several unsuccessful coup attempts occurred. By the mid eighties, however, a sort
of political stability had been established.6
of 1995. The government had attempted to introduce value-added tax (VAT) with little
prior information or consultation. However, the resulting civil disturbances forced the
government to withdraw the tax and to undertake consultations (see Pereira et al., 2000:
38). The VAT was re-introduced three years later after a much broader public information
campaign and down from the originally proposed 15 percent to 10 percent.
While economic decline was equally dramatic in Tanzania in the 1970s, recognising the
need for reform and acting on it appear to have taken much longer than in Ghana. With
support from like-minded bilateral donors (mostly the Nordic countries of Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden), Tanzania was able, even though the country’s relationship
with the IMF and the World Bank had virtually collapsed by 1981, to attempt to forge its
way out of the economic crisis relying on national experts. Between 1981 and 1983, it
introduced ‘home-grown’ initiatives such as the National Economic Survival Programme
of 1981-2. These, however, failed to address the core weaknesses of the economy and were
subsequently abandoned (Stein 1991: 93-4).
The decade that followed the introduction of economic reforms in the early 1980s saw
many initiatives and programmes whose implementation was complicated by lack of a
broad-based domestic consensus for reform.5 The slow pace of implementation also
reflected the difficulty of undoing the country’s socialist legacy. An important landmark of
the socialist past was the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which led to the nationalisation of
businesses as well as the collectivisation of rural activities including farming. It had also
strengthened control over the economy of the sole political party—Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM)—under the leadership of Nyerere. Thus in the early 1980s socialism was much
more embedded in Tanzanian society, when reforms began, than Rawlings’ leftist
populism was in Ghana. The Tanzanian tradition of consensus-building and participatory
decision-making also reduced space for dramatic reform action by the leadership. Above
all, Nyerere’s influence as President, head of CCM and elder statesman meant that little
could be done without his consent. Since reforms implied the undoing of his legacy,
reformers had to tread carefully. Indeed the pace of reform accelerated markedly and
gained momentum after he stepped down from the presidency in 1985.
The shifting fortunes of groups supporting limited and guided liberalisation and those
supporting a more open approach were reflected in policy inconsistencies in Tanzania in
the mid-eighties. For instance, towards the end of 1987, even elements in the government
continued to advocate for further liberalisation, the Ministries of Agriculture and Livestock
and Local Government and Co-operatives banned private businessmen from buying
produce directly from farmers, with only co-operative unions and primary societies
allowed to do so (Kiondo, 1991: 31). Among the two groups vying for influence over
economic policy, the first included the bulk of the party elite and business groups
connected to them, while the second comprised mainly Asian business families. Political
sensitivities, it has been argued, precluded the latter from overt declaration of support for
the reforms (Kiondo, 1991: 39). Moreover, the reforms were perceived as secretive even
by highly placed party officials.
5 Bigsten et al. (2001) provides a good flavour of the internal debate of the time.7
3.1 Adjustment programmes
In 1983, the PNDC introduced a four-year Economic Recovery Programme in Ghana
which, together with its follow up in 1987-91, received substantial assistance from donors
and multilateral agencies. Reform objectives included movement towards market-based
prices and exchange rates and demonstrable fiscal discipline. A discrete devaluation of the
cedi was followed by the introduction of a fully-fledged auction-based exchange rate
system. In 1988, Ghana became the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to introduce
foreign exchange bureaux, where foreign exchange was traded with ‘no questions asked’.
The rehabilitation of the country's deteriorated ports, roads and railways was given priority
early in the programme, as well as the liberalisation of input and producer markets, notably
in the cocoa sector.
However, the impact of reforms was not uniformly positive. Thus in 1988 the PNDC
adopted a Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD)
one of the first of its type in sub-Saharan Africa. It was a short-term measure with a focus
on employment creation, supporting those retrenched from the public sector, meeting the
basic needs of the poor and encouraging community participation. However, not entirely
unexpectedly, the impact of PAMSCAD on poverty reduction was limited by poor
implementation, political interference and lack of capacities at the lower levels, where
interventions were to be concentrated (Batse et al., 1999).
In the area of institutional reforms, the government embarked on the restructuring of the
civil service in 1987. The main objective was to reduce overstaffing and make civil service
wages competitive, while decompressing the wage structure. The reforms faced
considerable internal resistance, especially from older cohorts of workers. Moreover, the
pay reform by only raising wages modestly, did not significantly enhance incentives within
the service. It has been argued that the relatively modest outcomes of the civil service
reform are partly to blame on the proliferation of reforms, often competing, in the late
1980s and early 1990s, that stretched the government’s implementation capacities to the
limit (Pereira et al., 2000: 43).
Privatisation was, for example, undertaken at this time with equally unsatisfactory results.
Between 1988 and 1992, its pace was erratic, accelerating between 1994-6 and then losing
momentum after that. As in many other sub-Saharan African countries, state divestiture
was subject to pressure from vested interests and politicians. Lack of technical capacity for
evaluating companies, writing contracts and undertaking due diligence was, however, often
the main impediment. The membership of the Divestiture Implementation Committee was
dominated by political appointees chosen from supporters of the PNDC, but with little
experience in the private sector.
In the early 1990s, with the onset of multiparty democracy, there was a noticeable
slowdown in reforms. The loss of fiscal discipline, including sharp increases in civil
service wages, in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 1992 meant
a breakdown in macroeconomic stabilisation. A political business cycle of sorts had thus
emerged in Ghana. Although the government launched a National Institutional Renewal
Programme (NIRP) in late 1994, in a bid to better co-ordinate public sector reforms, the
earlier momentum was not regained.8
Still, there is no doubt that the reforms enabled Ghana to return to steady growth, albeit
from a narrow base. In a matter of three years (1983-6), macroeconomic reforms helped
lower inflation by 90 percentage points to 33 percent. Traditional exports improved rapidly
as producers responded to higher producer prices and the removal of marketing
impediments, although remaining confined to a few products. In addition to the positive
macroeconomic gains in Ghana, poverty and inequality were reduced over the reform
period. The incidence of extreme poverty declined from 36 percent of the population at the
beginning of the 1990s to 29 percent at the end of the decade, although with sharp
variation across regions. In Accra, the capital, extreme poverty declined over the same
period from 11.5 percent to 2.5 percent (Aryeetey et al., 2000; Armstrong, 1996), while
improvement in the poorer North was slight. Also notable was the improvement in income
distribution during the reform period. The Gini coefficient declined from 35.9 in 1988 to
32.7 ten years later (Tsikata, 2000). These gains are closely linked to the nature of Ghana’s
economic reforms. They had focused on the resuscitation of the agricultural sector by inter
alia offering better producer prices to farmers and improving social service provision in
the rural areas. The rehabilitation of the infrastructure created additional job opportunities
(Ahiakpor, 1991). The economic recovery was made possible by financial assistance from
the donor community, thus the policymakers’ ability to win the latter’s confidence was also
crucial to success.
As a commentary on the fragility of the achievements of the initial reforms, the
macroeconomic stability of the late 1980s in Ghana was rapidly reversed with the
introduction of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. Subsequently, growth became
uneven, fiscal indiscipline re-emerged, as well as inflation. It is clear that the quick
implementation of the earlier reforms was partly the result of a more streamlined
‘command’ structure of a dedicated, if non-pluralist, government. With the entry of
democracy and competitive politics, the policy agenda was no longer straightforward,
necessitating bargaining and compromise over party boundaries.
As noted earlier, Tanzania’s initial conditions differed from those of Ghana. Importantly,
the latter’s military government was not constrained by political commitments from the
past. However, the countries shared rundown economies as well as the desperate need for
financial resources. As in Ghana, foreign supporters, and isolated but influential domestic
groups, made the case that Tanzania needed to approach the IMF and World Bank for
advice and funding. Thus between 1982 and 1986, the government undertook to implement
reform.6 Notably, on the basis of a report by an independent Tanzania Advisory Group, a
Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced in 1982. It is noteworthy, however, that
the team was funded by an IDA technical assistance credit and its members had to be
cleared by both the Tanzanian government and the World Bank.7 Besides the devaluation
of the shilling to boost exports, prices, including those for producers, were partially
liberalised and government expenditure and money supply were reduced. Measures were
also taken to improve the efficiency of the parastatal sector.
6 The discussion of events is based on Kiondo (1991) and on interviews with important participants who
were advisers, academics or government officials at the time.
7 The Tanzania Advisory Group was established in late 1981 because of an understanding between the
former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and former World Bank President McNamara. An IDA Technical
Assistance Credit financed it. The members agreed upon by both Tanzania and the World Bank were M.
Head, C. Pratt and G.K. Helleiner. In the secretariat were B. van Arkadie and J. Loxley.9
In 1986, a fully-fledged IMF-supported Economic Recovery Program was introduced
during the first year of the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who had replaced Julius
Nyerere in 1985. There was further devaluation of the shilling and a gradual movement
towards a more market determined exchange rate system. These were accompanied by
further price liberalisation and monetary tightening in a bid to eliminate the inflation
overhang. To consolidate these reforms, as well as mitigate their social costs, an Economic
and Social Action Programme (ESAP) was introduced in 1989.
The transition from macroeconomic stability to structural reforms in the civil service and
the parastatal sector was equally difficult in Tanzania. The first phase of the civil service
reform programme (1993-6) focused on retrenchment, while the second, which began in early
1996, addressed institutional issues, including the strengthening of managerial capacity in
government. With respect to state divestiture, the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform
Commission was set up in 1993, following the amendment of the Public Corporations Act
of 1992, to handle privatisation. According to the commission, as of January 2000 close to
50 per cent of a total portfolio of 383 state-owned companies had been privatised.8
However, as in other sub-Saharan African countries, it was easier to privatise the smaller
companies than the monopolies in the utilities sector, notably those supplying water and
electric power. Difficulties have ranged from the latent distrust of private sector activities
in Tanzania to failure to raise sufficient funds to compensate workers who have been laid
off, to the existence of bad debts in virtually all the companies offered for sale making
negotiations for their divestiture intractable (Bigsten and Danielson, 1999: 86-7).
However, it is illusory to think that Tanzania’s socialist legacy had been put to rest
(Baregu, 1994). The policy reversals experienced in the 1990s were the direct results of the
unresolved debate between the ‘nationalistic liberalisers’, that is those that felt that reform
could build on the earlier collectivist premises and the ‘free-marketeers’, those that wanted
a complete break with the controls of the past. Recent political statements have, however,
advocated placing restraints on the activities of foreign businesses in certain sectors of the
economy, suggesting that the latter group has not quite taken the day. A reason why this
tug of war seems to go on without resolution is that the Tanzanian political leadership
places enormous importance on the ‘politics of accommodation’. Cabinet members enjoy a
degree of autonomy, lack of which would probably drive them to the opposition.
Therkildsen (2000: 66) has noted that in Tanzania ‘policy decisions…do not necessarily
reflect collectively binding political compromises nor genuine political support for the
reform package as a whole. Rather, such decisions are often influenced by larger political
aims (which may not be relevant to the reform per se) or by accommodation to perceived
or real donor pressures, or to individual ministries’ resource-mobilising strategy vis-à-vis
donors.’
As in Ghana, growth in Tanzania rebounded after the introduction of reforms, but was
much lower and with a more modest impact on poverty. Between 1987 and 1992, real GDP
growth averaged 3.5 percent, double the average growth of the previous decade. The last
half of the 1990s noted only a modest increase in growth to an average of 3.7 percent. Thus
in terms of welfare, Tanzania’s picture is mixed. The gains made in education and health
8 See the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission’s Impact of Privatisation in Tanzania, January
2000: 10.10
during the socialist era, and eroded during the crisis years, have not been restored.
Furthermore, preliminary results from an undergoing household budget survey suggest that
poverty may have increased in the 1990s. Gross and net enrolment ratios have been
stagnant at best, while despite rising costs borne by Tanzanian households, the quality of
primary education and healthcare is deteriorating (Cooksey and Mmuya, 1997; Cooksey et
al., 1997).
3.2 The institutional framework
In both Ghana and Tanzania, initial economic reforms focused on macroeconomic
stabilisation and primarily involved the technical staff of the ministries of finance, the
central banks, and the planning commissions. Thus in both countries, a relatively small
group of people was involved in the initial analysis. However, the composition of the
groups differed, in each country, as did the extent to which final programme designs
incorporated their views.
In Ghana, a core group of technical staff mostly from the Ministry of Finance worked with
an experienced former Minister of Finance and the new Secretary for Finance to put
together a programme in the early 1980s. A Ghanaian World Bank staff member visited
Ghana at regular intervals and also met with the government’s team in Washington before
the negotiations and advised its members. Those involved in this process have indicated
that the programmes that were ultimately negotiated with the Bretton Woods institutions
were very much Ghanaian products. However, given the departure from its populist
rhetoric, the PNDC government was compelled to explain its change of tactics to its key
constituencies (students and workers in particular), especially regarding the nature of the
reform programme and why it was necessary.
In retrospect the stability of the core decision-making team was crucial to the success of
Ghana’s early reforms as it provided continuity. Although up to 1986 three teams,
including the Economic Management Committee, the Structural Adjustment Team and the
Budget Task Force, were involved, their somewhat overlapping membership was merged
in 1989 to form the Economic Review Committee.9 The new team combined technocrats
and PNDC functionaries that mostly knew each other well. The Committee met biannually,
including the so-called ‘external examiners’ (Ghanaians living overseas). However,
although by all accounts, this new arrangement strengthened co-ordination, its institutional
foundation was weak. To function properly, the new arrangement relied heavily on
personal relationships and did not draw sufficiently on the know-how and experience of
the civil servants in the ministries involved in the reform process.
In Ghana, the reform programme and its success became strongly identified with the long-
serving Finance Minister, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey. In conjunction with changes in the core
economic team, ownership of the programme became increasingly personalised and
associated with him and a small team around him. With his departure in the mid 1990s, the
earlier cohesiveness in Ghanaian reform was lost and a new modus operandi had to be
9 The Committee was chaired by Kojo Tsikata and included the Secretary of Finance, two Deputy Secretaries
for Finance, Governor of the Central Bank, a Former Governor of the Bank of Ghana then at UNCTAD, a
Ghanaian World Bank manager, the Ghanaian Ambassador to the US (a former Secretary of finance himself)
and four close advisors (some of whom held Secretary positions). With regard to earlier reforms see World
Bank (1993 a,b).11
found. Ghana illustrates that reform ownership becomes more complex as the need for
reform shifts to sector levels, requiring a variety of microeconomic interventions.
Moreover, early success is no guarantee for future progress. In Ghana, initial success and
paucity of similarly promising performers on the continent attracted much donor support,
completely overwhelming officials in the line ministries. It has been estimated that by the
early 1990s ‘senior officials were spending an estimated 44 weeks a year facilitating or
participating in donor supervision missions, time they were unable to devote to their ‘own’
work’ (Sawyerr, 1997: 7). Thus, ironically, early success did not make it easier for the
government to own reforms or to embark on further reforms.
In Tanzania, given the initial resistance within the party and government to reforms, the
core analytical work was borne by academicians at the University of Dar es Salaam and
technical staff from the Bank of Tanzania and the Ministry of Finance. They were, for
example, largely responsible for the design of the abortive ‘home-grown’ reform efforts,
mentioned earlier, and for providing advice during subsequent negotiations with the IMF
and World Bank.
However, in contrast with Ghana, the Tanzanian side was unable to gain much from its
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank at the outset. In a recent paper, Mutalemwa,
Noni and Wangwe (1999: 31) have argued that ‘even when potential centers of
...intellectual capacity existed, they were either bypassed for lack of a consultative
mechanism for interacting with non-decision making bodies, or their comments would be
ignored because of the kasumba10 habit of listening only to foreigners’. In Tanzania, the
apparent lack of influence on policy implementation led to the disintegration of the core
group of technocrats mentioned earlier. A series of personnel changes in the economic
ministries prevented continuity.
Finally, in contrasting the institutional responses in the two countries, the case of the
Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) is illustrative. Since 1993, the Ghanaian government
has conducted its own public expenditure reviews, with the Finance Ministry using inputs
from the sector ministries and the Planning Commission to do so. In addition to the overall
review of expenditures each year, the PER also focuses on an issue of particular concern
with respect expenditure and fiscal balance. In Tanzania, on the other hand, the PER
working group, comprising government, donors and academics, was first established in
1997. Although the PER process is driven by mechanisms set up in Tanzania, the country’s
traditional aid dependence nevertheless tends to elevate the role of the donors in the
process. The secretariat of the working group is for example based at the World Bank
offices, although the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance chairs the meetings.
Comments on the reports related to the exercise are more likely to come from donors other
than nationals. Moreover, although the PER is supposed to be a Tanzanian document, it
still goes through the review process of the World Bank leading to inordinate delays. This
reduces the legitimacy of the Tanzanian consultative process. In the most recent cycle, the
bulk of the work and consultations took place in Dar es Salaam in April-May 2000 but
eleven months later the final PER report was still not available.
10 ‘Kasumba’ is a Kiswahili word that translates loosely as ‘having a complex’.12
3.3 The role of donors
The discussion of reform ownership leads to that of the role of the donor community in the
provision of financial resources and technical assistance and the nature of the attached
conditionalities (Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Rowley, 2000). Lancaster and Wangwe (2000:
40) have argued that ‘aid can strengthen organizations by expanding the technical and
administrative capacity of their staffs and by increasing their activities... but it can also
weaken recipient country institutions by undercutting the planning, budgeting,
administrative capacities, and general operations of recipient organizations and their
political accountability and legitimacy. It can also reduce the sense of initiative and
responsibility on the part of individuals in recipient organizations for achieving their goals
and missions’. Whether one or the other happens depends on how aid is managed. This is
in turn a function of the historical relationship with donors, their numbers, the institutional
framework for aid co-ordination and the capacity of recipients to absorb aid.
The nature and magnitude of donor support both before and during the reform episodes
were different in Ghana and Tanzania. Political instability in Ghana had reduced donor
interest in the country. However, the rapid withdrawal of aid only began when the
Acheampong government repudiated foreign commercial loans in 1973, with the
introduction of a ‘we won’t pay’ (or ‘yentua’) policy. Subsequent increases in corruption in
the face of economic decline did not help revive donor interest. By 1981, aid per capita
was US$14 or 3.4 percent of GNP, both were well below the sub-Saharan African average.
As already noted the initial rhetoric of the PNDC did not endear it to the donor community,
with its ties to Libya scaring off other potential donors. By 1981, Ghana’s sources of
external finance had narrowed down to a small number of donors (Harrigan and Younger,
2000: 193). Ghana had thus undertaken the economic reforms of 1982-3 with limited donor
support. It was only when the Economic Recovery Programme began to show good results
that donors jumped onto the bandwagon. Ironically this donor stampede had negative
implications for the government's ability to manage aid flows and thus hurt aid
effectiveness.
In contrast, Tanzania has always had strong support from bilateral donors, particularly
from the Nordic countries. This support was partly a reflection of the respect enjoyed
around the world by President Julius Nyerere. His policies of ‘African Socialism’ had
initially been effective in improving social indicators (primary school enrolment and
literacy rates) and welfare in Tanzania. The dominance of donors in Tanzania presented a
real challenge for government, however. Indeed, it has been argued that donor support may
have delayed reform in the early 1980s. In efforts to address this dependence, recent years
have seen the government putting in place institutional mechanisms to improve its
management of aid inflows.
Apart from the difference in the degree of aid intensity in the two countries, Tanzania
shows a marked stability of donor composition, with Sweden, Denmark, Germany and
Norway and consistently among the biggest donors up to the early nineties. The Nordic
countries, with their own background of social equity and democracy, were particularly
enamoured by Tanzania. In fact, the Nordics, as a bloc, became with time something of a
donor lobby for Tanzania. This was important during the earlier phase of the economic
reforms when Tanzania had to negotiate with the IMF and the World Bank under rather
acrimonious circumstances. The Nordic countries continued to support Tanzania even after
the multilateral agencies had cut off support in the early 1980s. This long-standing13
relationship has contributed to significant commitment on both sides. Close personal
relationships were formed between successive Nordic ambassadors and Nyerere himself. A
downside of this is that when the donors were forced to change their approach in light of
changed realities, as during the period 1993–4 when serious concerns arose regarding weak
fiscal structure, poor accountability and lack of democracy, their actions were deemed to
be intrusive by the Tanzanians (Helleiner et al., 1995).
The composition of aid donors to Ghana has changed markedly over the years. In the
1970s, the most important donors were Canada, United Kingdom and the United States,
while in the 1980s aid from Denmark, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands increased in
importance. In the 1990s, Japan became the largest bilateral donor (Tsikata, 2001). Thus,
historically the country has not had a dominant long-term relation with a donor or group of
donors, and the associated donor leverage has thus been missing. However although
traditionally less intrusive in approach and not focusing on policy based lending, Japan’s
eminence in providing aid to Ghana might be changing this. This was, for example, evident
in Ghana’s decision not to apply for HIPC relief, since Japan does not support debt
forgiveness as a development and growth strategy for poor countries. Comparing the
benefits of Japanese aid, which tends to be less conditional, to those of HIPC relief (with
its attendant conditionalities), Ghanaian authorities chose to keep the former. As a
postscript, recently the UK successfully dissuaded the new Ghanaian government from
rejection of the HIPC initiative.11
With economic improvement in the 1980s, aid to Ghana increased exponentially from
US$9 to US$49 per capita between 1983 and 1991. Much of the support came directly
from the World Bank, which saw Ghana as its showpiece for economic reform in Africa.
But as discussed above, Ghanaian policymakers were better prepared than other countries
in the region. Martin (1991), has noted that the good economic outcomes and better
preparation enabled Ghanaians to enjoy, at least for a while, a special relationship with the
IMF and the World Bank which led to flexibility on the part of the multilateral agencies
and won Ghana a number of concessions. For example between 1992-7, Ghana was able to
defer action on devaluation, price control, trade liberalisation and privatisation.
In both countries, the proliferation of aid, in terms of flows and the number of donors
involved, created serious aid-management problems. Thus the impact of aid on the local
bureaucracies has become a concern in its own right, since it impedes the quality of
ownership that aid demands (Brautigam and Botchwey, 1998). In Ghana administrating the
conditions associated with the different projects stretched the staff of the sectoral and line
ministries to the limit.
However, although this problem was well known and governments tried to put in place
mechanisms to resolve it, success was not achieved. Ghana for example created the
International Economic Relations Department in the Ministry of Finance to supervise aid
matters while Tanzania set up a Tanzania Assistance Strategy in an effort at better co-
ordination. In both cases, donors pledged to collaborate with these new institutional
arrangements, although in practice they were flouted. Many donors continue to deal
directly with project management units in the sector ministries, which they feel are more
11 In April 2001, following a visit by the UK Minister for Overseas Co-operation, the Ghanaian government
announced that it was applying for HPIC relief.14
efficient than the co-ordination departments. Weak institutional capacities have meant that
ownership continues to be shallow and the results inadequate. The poor budgeting of aid
flows that results from this bypassing of the central budget, makes it difficult for the
governments to ensure that their priorities are met by donor funding. This further
compounds the difficulty of managing aid. In Tanzania, this is especially true of the
development budget where up to 90 percent of the funds are from donors sources, with 70
percent not going through the budget (Tsikata et al., 1999). In contrast, less than 40 percent
of donor aid to Ghana is channelled outside of the budget.
An ironical feature of aid to Tanzania during the reform period is that donors were
increasingly worried about the apparent lack of government ownership of the programmes.
Bagachwa et al. (1998: 63) note, with respect to Danish aid, that programmes were
plagued by a perceived decline in the administrative capacity of public institutions, in the
ability of the government to contribute domestic resources as well as rising incidence of
corruption. The problems then forced Denmark to institute parallel delivery structures,
notably NGOs, under its control. However, this reduced the effectiveness of Danish aid,
with the aid relationship between Tanzania and Denmark becoming increasingly unequal.
Similar sentiments have arisen from reviews of Finnish (Porvali and Associates. 1995),
Norwegian (Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999: 122) and Swedish (Adam
et al., 1994) aid programmes. A lack of genuine dialogue is generally indicated, with
Tanzania being mainly a commentator on the planned programmes rather than the initiator.
In 1994, Denmark sponsored a group of eminent academics to look at the Tanzania-donor
relationship. The Helleiner Report, which resulted, noted that donors were ‘frequently
ambivalent about the ownership issue: some demand that that the government take greater
control of their programmes and at the same time resist when it attempts to do so at the
expense of their own preferred projects’.12 The report recommended a move towards
greater Tanzanian ownership of aid programmes and processes, with government
formulating a clear development strategy for the country. The donors needed to co-ordinate
their activities better and to harmonise their rules and procedures, while leaving overall co-
ordination of development in the hands of Tanzanians, focused especially at the sector
level. Priority was to be given to political and administrative reforms and to addressing the
problems of corruption. The report suggested that in the medium to long term, aid could be
reduced, but it warned against reductions if they were to take place ‘abruptly and without
warning’ (Helleiner et al., 1995).
In conclusion, it is notable that generous aid to Tanzania, and from a somewhat
homogeneous set of donors, did not ensure a better use or planning for the aid inflows.
Indeed traditional aid ties seem to have inhibited ownership at various levels. In Ghana on
the other hand, donors had fled the country with the decline of the economy and
increasingly autocratic nature of the regimes. Reforms were embarked on with little aid.
Still, Ghana was able to formulate a reform programme that was more acceptable at home
and that yielded faster results in the first decade of implementation than in Tanzania. The
12 In a later paper (Helleiner, 2000) based on interviews conducted while in Tanzania, Helleiner elaborated
on this point adding to examples in the initial report. When asked to define what they understood by
ownership, donor representatives variously answered (i) ‘We have to pressure the government to take
ownership of…’ ; (ii) ‘Ownership exists when they do what we want them to do but they do it voluntarily’;
and (iii) ‘We want them to take ownership. Of course they must do what we want. If not, they should get
their money elsewhere’.15
Ghanaian government was unable, however, to withstand the political pressures that came
with political liberalisation in the 1990s and the earlier policy cohesiveness collapsed
(Harrigan and Younger, 2000).
4. Determinants of ownership: summary and conclusions
This chapter has focused on the subject of reform ownership in sub-Saharan Africa, with
Ghana and Tanzania as case studies. In Ghana economic reform had sprung from the
revolutionary zeal of young military officers and left-leaning academics. While Bretton
Woods type reforms were not their initial focus, a general lack of resources and support
had forced them to approach the IMF and World Bank. Significantly, when the decision for
reform was made the PNDC was able to bring many of its followers on board by
encouraging a broad debate, which contributed to the success of the early reforms,
generating rapid growth, macroeconomic stabilisation, and increased donor assistance.
In Tanzania, on the other hand, the initial conditions were radically different. The
government had enjoyed a long period of uninterrupted donor support, and many donors
continued to deliver aid even when the economic performance deteriorated. Continued aid
inflows helped the government to resist drastic reforms and to attempt to introduce its
‘home made’ versions. As the crisis deepened, and with donors becoming more willing to
withdraw aid, the government had no option but to embark on reforms. These were
implemented in an environment not marked by a clear break with the past and where
groups within the government and the private sector wrestled for control of the reform
agenda.
Most recently, however, Tanzania seems to have made more tangible progress, with the
government making efforts to influence the reform agenda positively. This has been
rewarded with improved economic performance and higher aid inflows. Ghana, on the
other hand, seems to have regressed. The economic performance of the 1990s was clearly
undistinguished while the onset of political pluralism seems to have introduced a political
business cycle, characterised by worsening macroeconomic aggregates at the onset of
elections.
A set of six interrelated lessons can be derived from the above comparison of Ghana and
Tanzania. The first is that in both countries historical antecedents to reform are important
determinants of subsequent progress. Also that while reform can sprout from many
political environments, what is important is political commitment. In Tanzania reforms
were popularly seen as ‘imposed’ from outside, both within government and among the
population. This perception was reinforced by the fact that Tanzania’s home grown efforts,
rolled out with fanfare as alternatives to structural adjustment, failed to garner foreign
support. By contrast Ghana’s sense of commitment was reinforced by the fact that its
economic programme drawn up domestically, but patterned on those of the Bretton Woods
institutions, was largely accepted and opened the way for resource inflows.
Secondly, the nature of the aid relationship and how it evolves are important determinants
of reform ownership. This relates to the number of donors relative to the country's co-
ordination capacity and the type of technical assistance it receives. In Tanzania and Ghana
(from the late eighties onwards), the sheer number of donors and the volume of aid
overwhelmed staff in the key economic ministries, leaving them little time to strategize and16
simply think. The failure of governments to articulate their priorities and the absence of
institutional capacities led to loss of control over programmes. Donors took to bypassing
the government by constructing parallel mechanisms for aid delivery. The absence of a
well-established institutional framework for managing aid thus led to a lack of selectivity
and to the proliferation of projects.
The third lesson is that analytical capacity among implementing institutions is crucial to
the ownership of policies and programmes. The differing experiences of Ghana and
Tanzania are partly linked to varying capacities within the countries and the use to which
they were put. Analytical capacity appears to have been stronger in Ghana than in
Tanzania, although the latter had a very strong Department of Economics at the University
of Dar es Salaam. Yet, as discussed earlier, the Tanzanian government failed to draw on
this technical expertise effectively or consistently.
The fourth lesson is that reform ownership is a dynamic concept, evolving with changes in
the economy. In Ghana, the first decade of reform saw both good economic outcomes,
reduced poverty in rural areas and improving socioeconomic indicators. These
strengthened the government’s hand and increased its commitment to reform. In Tanzania
where the macroeconomic improvements have not been matched by social sector
improvements, it was harder to find champions for broader reforms. The nostalgia for the
socialist days, when social services were provided almost free, was palpable while the
political anxiety regarding the benefits of reform remained high until only recently. Good
macroeconomic performance and improving government revenues are also important in
helping the government to attract skilled professionals and to remunerate its employees.
Poor economic outcomes have the insidious effect of encouraging the most qualified civil
servants to leave for the private sector.
The fifth lesson is that a strong institutional mechanism for accountability is the foundation
on which mutual trust is built between recipient and donor. In a sense accountability buys
the recipient country some implementation space. A loss of trust following perceived
mismanagement (whether through incompetence or corruption), such as in Tanzania in
1993-4, or Ghana during the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections, can set a
vicious cycle of events in motion. Aside from withdrawing, a typical reaction of donors
can be to try to micromanage projects by introducing parallel management units, with
expatriate staff. This intrusiveness rarely leads to trust between recipient and donor or to
reform ownership by the recipient.
The last lesson is that the political context matters in several ways for ownership. The
emergence of winners and losers in the reform process can strengthen or weaken
ownership depending on their ability to shift the political balance. Where the gains tend to
be enjoyed by groups with which the government is aligned, there will be open official
acceptance of the reforms (e.g. Ghana during the first five years of reform). However, if
the political costs of associating with the reforms and alienating support groups exceed the
benefits, then the government is unlikely to be a vocal champion of the process (à la
Tanzania). The political context also establishes the degree of accountability to which
government is held. In most African countries, public discourse on economic development
and reform remains inadequate and the means of sanctioning poor government
performance are equally meagre. Thus a democratic system whereby the government can
be voted out peacefully, if the citizens are dissatisfied with it, is necessary if governments
are to be held accountable to citizens for the policies pursued.17
An important implication of the above lessons is that both donors and aid recipients need
to work much harder at creating conditions that will ensure that reform policies are
properly defined, articulated and implemented. The donor community’s desire to control
aid, in order to ensure full accountability to the home electorate must be balanced against
the need to allow sufficient space for recipients to refine their bureaucratic systems and
evolve their own procedures for aid management. For a true partnership to emerge, both
sides need to let go of the old conceptions and focus on strengthening institutions that can
facilitate greater recipient ownership. This will not only demand higher levels of
accountability in recipient countries but also measures to establish mutual trust as well as
respect for each community’s need to respond with credibility to the demands of its
political constituency.
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